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SAFE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMATIC MICROPROCESSOR 
SYSTEMS OF LEVEL CROSSING ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE SPA-4 
SYSTEM 
Summary.  Fulfilling  high  requirements  of  safety  and  reliability  is  an  important 
question in devices of railway traffic control. Increased safety in computer systems is 
reached in the simplest way through redundancy of hardware and software, but also with 
other  methods.  A  microprocessor  system  of  automatic  SPA-4  level  crossing, 
manufactured by Bombardier Transportation Katowice (Poland), is a benchmark in the 
paper. 
BEZPIECZNA REALIZACJA MIKROPROCESOROWYCH SYSTEMÓW 
SAMOCZYNNEJ SYGNALIZACJI PRZEJAZDOWEJ NA PRZYKŁADZIE 
SYSTEMU SPA-4 
Streszczenie. Istotnym zagadnieniem w urządzeniach sterowania ruchem kolejowym 
jest  spełnianie  wysokich  wymagań  bezpieczeństwa  i  niezawodności.  Zwiększenie 
bezpieczeństwa w systemach komputerowych osiąga się najprościej przez redundancję 
urządzeń  i  oprogramowania,  ale  takŜe  innymi  sposobami.  Punktem  odniesienia  w 
referacie jest mikroprocesorowy system samoczynnej sygnalizacji przejazdowej typu SPA-
4 wyprodukowany przez Bombardier Transportation (ZWUS) Polska Sp. z o.o. Katowice.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Because of the nature of tasks executed, traffic control systems have to meet special requirements 
referring to safe operation. Safe setups have to react to any interference with the signal or damage to 
the  element  in  a  safe  way,  which  means  to  the  composition  of  the  railway  crossing  in  case  of 
application of devices stopping the traffic of cars. 
As a rule, computer systems of railway traffic control should be executed as “fail-safe”, which 
means  that  a  single  damage  (of  equipment,  software)  or  interference  cannot  cause  a  dangerous 
situation, assuming negligibly small probability of double (multiple) damage occurrence. Additionally, 
single errors are assumed to be detected in a relatively short time and the damage detected by an 
appropriate system’s response to the fact. The SIL 4 (Safety Integrity Levels) included in the norms of 
the  European  Committee  of  Normalization  in  CENELEC  Electrotechnics  is  another  important 70  M.Kornaszewski, Z.Łukasik 
criterion. SIL 4 is the highest safety level and determines the damage intensity (the probability of 
damage occurrence in a unit time) for a single system element 10E-11. 
A  computer  system  of  automatic  SPA-4  type  level  crossing,  manufactured  by  Bombardier 
Transportation Katowice, has been the subject of our investigations.  
2. MAIN TRENDS PERMITTING REACHING OF A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIABILITY AND 
SAFETY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC CONTROL 
For computer systems of railway traffic control it is necessary to consider issues of safety and 
reliability on two levels: 
−  of technical devices, creating the infrastructure of railway traffic control system; 
−  of system software. 
To meet the requirements of safety the system has to consist of two computers linked together in a 
suitable structure, which at least performs appropriate data processing and mutual check-up possible, 
etc. There are also other systems, based on one unit. For obtaining required conditions of safety the 
other computer is utilized as an urgent reserve. 
Appropriate software operations are executed for the safety of single-channel systems. They are 
relying on encoding and converting data through two programs in one unit which are testing each 
other. The best situation is when applications are written by different groups of programmers. 
Multi-channel systems, most often two-channel or three-channel, are named “2 from 2” and “2 
from 3” respectively, of which safety is ensured by redundancy of hardware and software. In solutions 
with two computers results are compared, and according to safe work condition of system “2 from 2” 
only full compatibility effects of all calculations are obtained on output of active channels. In the “2 
from 3” system the negative result of comparison switches to action/operate the third computer, which 
result of converting is taking under consideration alike previously on two computers [1,4]. 
2.1. CONTROL SETUPS 
Automatic SPA-4 system of level crossing was designed on the basis of Programmable Logic 
Controllers of the MINICONTROL type of Austrian manufacturer Bernecker & Rainer. The setup of 
the control contains two PLC drivers independently executing the control program. Drivers are linked 
with  the  use  of  a  TTY  interface,  which  also  assures  synchronization  of  two  channels  operation. 
Detection of the lack of parallelism is treated as a signalling failure. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of the configuration of PLC drivers in the automatic SPA-4 system of level crossing  
Rys. 1. Przykład konfiguracji sterowników PLC w systemie samoczynnej sygnalizacji przejazdowej SPA-4 Safe implementation of automatic microprocessor systems…  71 
PLC  drivers  should  generate,  based on  their  current  input  signals,  output  signals that  in turn 
control signalling and executive devices. Information about error occurrences or failure-free work of 
signalling and information about the state of signalling (switching on or stand-by) is sent to ERP-6 
type  remote  control  device  by  means  of  the  transmission  network.  This  information  is  generated 
independently in each of two signalling drivers [5,7]. 
2.2. CONTROL PROGRAMME 
The redundancy of control programme is often the most encountered method of safety assurance 
in computer systems from the software point of view. A change to the emergency control programme 
of the control application is a method used in case of damage detection (both methods are operating on 
the system level, they respond to hardware and software errors themselves this way). In standard 
implementations  it  is  possible  to  encounter  two  basic  structures  capable  of  redundant  software 
detecting or of errors tolerating: 
−  n Version Programming (nVP) assumes n execution of similar programmes and selecting of the 
effect by a special comparing application; 
−  n Recovery Block (nRB) assumes replacing the damaged programme by the next equivalent 
programme  (from  the  sequence)  executed  in  the  application  at  the  moment  after  the  error 
finding [2,8]. 
Control application of the level crossing signalling originates from the activation of PROSYS 
system supplied by the manufacturer of drivers. The programme is executed in the sequential mode. 
The cycle length is 15÷25ms dependent of the quantity of warning devices. The software was written 
on the level of processor 6303 assembler. In PLC drivers there is a possibility of automatic conversion 
from the level of the internal language to the level of logical diagrams [3].   
For  a  specific  application  the  modification  of  programmes  consists  of  adding  or  removing 
software  blocks  executing  the  operation  of  each  device  without  infringing  the  structure  of  the 
programme. This has essential meaning to relevance containing all elements of the system in standard 
configuration of software correctness tests which are carried out from the point of view of nominal 
quantities. 
It is necessary because of software reliability to notice not detected errors of the project, casual 
errors  of  the  use  and  defect  of  resistance  to interferences  also  during  operation.  Indeed,  for  safe 
railway  traffic  control  systems  the  software  should  be  free  from  assumption,  errors  (semantic, 
syntactic, side effects of compilers, operating systems and utility programmes), however, the practice 
of using control computers and programmed drivers shows that states following e.g. incapacity result 
from hanging-up of the application or of the operating system [6,8]. 
3. FEATURES TOLERATING MAINTENANCE OF THE HIGH LEVEL OF SAFETY OF 
THE COMPUTER SPA-4 SYSTEM 
3.1. EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCY 
Two independently operating channels A and B exist in the setup of the SPA-4 system control: 
starting from the power supply, the battery of batteries, drivers, sensing devices, and ended in warning 
devices. An independent elaboration of output signals controlling each warning device follows on the 
basis of current values of actuating signals in each channel. Each channel has its independent source of 
actuating signals.  72  M.Kornaszewski, Z.Łukasik 
 
Fig. 2. Redundant structure of the SPA-4 system of level crossing automation  
Rys. 2. Struktura redundantna systemu samoczynnej sygnalizacji przejazdowej SPA-4 
Warning devices installed on the railway crossing are assigned to channels independent of their 
quantity and kind (A and B), so that in case of malfunction of one control channel the other channel 
ensures sufficient protection of the railway crossing when a train approaches [7].  
3.2. DIVERSIFICATION OF PROGRAMMES CONTROLLING CHANNELS A AND B 
Programmes for PLC drivers in channel A and B have been developed by independent teams of 
programmers.  Diversity  of  programming  languages  and  tools  (compilers)  was  also  taken  into 
consideration. 
Diversity of programmes takes into consideration among other things: 
−  two independent source programs; 
−  diversification of the structure; 
−  using various areas for two separate drivers by RAMs resulting  from the application;  
−  various methods of the same execution functions. 
Programmable Logic Controllers in channels A and B work combined with a serial TTY interface, 
through which an information exchange occurs between them to determine compatibility through the 
decision layer of the system which switching on or off signalling in both channels.  
3.3. TESTING THE CORRECTNESS OF SYSTEM MODULES AND DEVICES WORK 
UP-TO-DATE 
Controlling programmes contain procedures testing the correctness of work of feeding setups, 
moreover apart from procedures executing each function of the automatic system of level crossing 
devices, of warning and selected modules devices as well as the procedure and mechanisms of self-
testing of controlling setups.  
It is taken by testing devices of automatic system of SPA-4 level crossing from the application 
work in time, in particular: 
−  state control of traffic signalling lights lamps and warning discs on railway crossings; 
−  position of barrier drives and continuity of barrier poles on railway crossings; Safe implementation of automatic microprocessor systems…  73 
−  presence of signals from track sensors on modules for input drivers; 
−  communication of every PLC driver with organization of remote ERP-6 check-up; 
−  efficiency of signal transfer from sensing devices of optoisolators in track sensors to drivers A 
and B; 
−  existence of the supply voltage and of appropriate value of batteries’ voltage; 
−  communication between channels A and B. 
Communication between drivers in channels A and B allows comparing the value of the switch on 
signal  in  both  channels,  synchronization  of  the  control  of  signal  light  lamps  and  the  information 
exchange to switch on in both channels. If values of switching on signals in channel A and B are 
differing during the time exceeding 5s, the lack of synchronization error is detected.  
3.4. TESTING THE CONTROLLING PROGRAMME UP-TO-DATE   
The controlling programme, beyond procedures executing each function of the system, contains 
also  procedures  verifying  correct  execution,  verifying  every  software  cycle  and  the  procedure 
,correctness  of  current  values  of  automatic  system  of  the  level  crossing  parameters  (e.g.  train 
counters).  
The integrity of the controlling programme algorithm is tested in each cycle of the programme. 
The type applied to the SPA-4 system driver possesses reliable self-testing mechanisms [3]. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In practical solutions of railway traffic control computer systems, an increase in safety is reached 
most often through redundancy (excess). The simplest solution is executed through the two-channel 
construction of setups, consisting in the application of two, working in parallel, functional channels 
and in comparing of their work, and through two independent programmes written by various teams of 
programmers. The setup is the safest, the more diversified are both functional channels. It is related to 
larger complexity and at the same time to lower reliability of the setup and to heavy expenses.  
Safety  of  the  automatic  system  of  the  SPA-4  type  level  crossing  results  from  the  type  of 
applications of modern technologies (of programmable drivers), is based on two control channels, 
diversity of applications in channel A and B, possibilities of immediate faults detection in devices and 
applications (self-testing), and also on the possibility to carry out monitoring of the work system by 
both registration of all events and of failures.  
Computer  systems  of  the  railway  traffic  control  should  be  realized  and  configurated  using 
equipment  fulfilling  specific  requirements:  high  level  of  reliability,  possibility  to  enter  safety 
conditions (errors analysis and detecting and the proper reaction), modularity, possibility to link in the 
network,  simplicity  of  creating  various  configurations  (flexibility),  possibility  to  link  the  external 
infrastructure  to  different  elements,  possibility  to  connect  many  devices  used  and  many  external 
devices, possibility of work in specific, severe conditions (temperature, dampness, vibration). 
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